（来源：经济管理学刊）

近日，来自北京大学光华管理学院的张庆华教授、中央财经大学的田文佳副教授、复旦大学的王之副教授，合作撰写的论文“Picking Winners: Local Land Allocation and Bottom-Up Industrial Policy in China”（“挑选赢家：从工业用地分配偏好看中国地方产业政策的底层逻辑”），在发展经济学顶刊Journal of Development Economics发表。

# 论文简介 #

Title：

Picking Winners: Local Land Allocation and Bottom-Up Industrial Policy in China

Author：

Wenjia Tian, Zhi Wang, Qinghua Zhang 

Abstract：

This study examines the industrial preferences of local governments in China through the lens of land allocation. We analyze industrial land transactions from 2007 to 2019, a period marked by both expanding industrial policy and intensifying land market competition. Using a border discontinuity design that compares land transactions near county borders, we separate local government preferences from firm demand. We find systematic industrial favoritism: localities offer deeper price discounts to industries aligned with their existing specialization. This favoritism persists over time, is more pronounced in industries with substantial unrealized agglomeration potential, and is stronger in regions with well-developed market institutions. We further show that local governments comply with upper-level industrial policy only when it aligns with their own specialization. Together, these findings point to a bottom-up process in which local governments use land allocation to attract firms that reinforce local industrial strengths through agglomeration spillovers.

标题： 

挑选赢家：从工业用地分配偏好看中国地方产业政策的底层逻辑

中文摘要：

本研究从土地配置的视角考察中国地方政府的产业偏好。我们分析了2007年-2019年间的工业用地交易数据，这一时期既伴随着产业政策的持续扩张，也面临着土地市场竞争的日益加剧。通过采用边界断点设计，对县域边界附近的土地交易进行比较，我们将地方政府的偏好与企业需求区分开来。研究发现系统的产业倾斜现象：地方政府向与其现有专业化方向一致的产业提供更深的价格折扣。这种倾斜具有持续性，在集聚潜力尚未充分释放的产业中更为明显，并且在市场制度较为发达的地区表现更强。我们还发现，地方政府仅在上级产业政策与自身专业化方向一致时才会遵循该政策。综合而言，这些发现揭示了一个自下而上的过程，即地方政府通过土地配置来吸引那些能够通过集聚溢出效应强化本地产业优势的企业。